The deployment of North Korean troops in Russia to be used in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is a sign of desperation from the Russian president that amounts to no more than a quick-fix for frontline losses that is destined to cause longer-term problems, British former diplomats and analysts have warned.
South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence reported that thousands of North Korean troops, including 500 officers and three generals, have recently deployed to Russia to plug gaps in Moscow’s military, with up to 12,000 believed to be ready to be sent.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said on Friday he expects several of those units to join the fight in the Russian region of Kursk, which Kyiv has occupied since early August, as soon as the weekend.
Emil Kastehelmi, an analyst that runs the Black Bird Group, which tracks the war in Ukraine, argues these North Korea troops are unlikely to significantly improve Russia’s position on the battlefield.
“They have no concrete experience of challenges in a modern battlefield, and even a quick training by the Russians may not prepare them very well for that,” he says. “However it is arranged, it’s likely that the arriving forces may not be very effective in battle.”
But Putin, facing casualties of hundreds of soldiers a day, is desperate, according to John Foreman, former British defence attache to Moscow between 2019 and 2022 who specialised in analysing the Korean peninsula.
“It’s a sign of desperation. They had to go to North Korea to bail them out for manpower and ammunition. It shows the weakness in the Russian military industrial complex and that they’re desperate for personnel.”
“If you want to be a great power, you shouldn’t be kowtowing to North Korea,” he adds.
Neverthless, Russia’s relationship with North Korea has grown significantly since Putin launched his invasion, with Russia casting around for allies.
Mr Foreman says he remembers his North Korean counterpart having “nothing to do” back in 2020. “I couldn’t work out why they had one in Moscow,” he says. “But things have changed in the last four years.”
Earlier this year, North Korea began sending artillery shells to Russia to be used in Ukraine. Soon after, it sent ballistic missiles. The supplies helped Moscow regain the initiative on the eastern frontline; Russian forces have seized around 300 square miles of the Donetsk region in 2024. Last month, Russian forces advanced at their fastest rate in September this year of the entire war, according to western intelligence.
But those gains have come at a vast human cost, with Russia using waves of troops to try and overwhelm Ukrainian defensive lines.
Diplomatically, Putin could also pay a price, with the use of Pyongyang’s troops to bolster Russia’s forces damaging Moscow’s relationship with China, it’s most powerful ally. The Kremlin is rewarding North Korea with greater support, including nuclear technology.
“What we have seen this past week is another escalation in the relationship,” says Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation Fellow with the Asia-Pacific programme at the Chatham House think tank.
“North Korea knows that it has to supply Putin with what he needs in order to benefit both financially and in terms of missile technology.”
That has unnerved South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, and thereby pushed them further towards the US, Mr Howell suggests, creating what Beijing believes is a Nato-style alliance in the Indo-Pacific that is fundamentally anti-China.
“Russia and North Korea don’t care about their global reputation,” says Mr Howell. “But China cares a lot more about its international reputation and status.”
While Beijing is supportive of Russia and North Korea, insofar as they are united in opposing a US-led world order, its primary interest is in re-taking control of the independent Taiwan, which it believes is part of its territory.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine, however, is having a knock-on effect on pro-Taiwan alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
“From the get go of Russia and Kim Jong Un cosying up to each other, there’s been a degree of unease for China and others, including South Korea and Japan,” says Sir Laurie Bristow, former British ambassador to Russia from 2016 to 2020.
“China needs to manage a whole complex series of relationships and interests. They don’t need Russia complicating that further.”
But, ultimately, Putin’s war in Ukraine has become all-encompassing; testing relations with his most senior ally is a gamble he feels he must make.
“Putin’s approach is he needs to win the war and damn the consequences,” says Mr Foreman.
Ultimately, says Sir Laurie, “Putin is now all-in”.