It has long been an unofficial convention of war that hostilities may cease, or at least ease, on Christmas Day.
The most famous of such truces famously took place in 1914, when German and British soldiers abandoned their trenches, sang carols and exchanged gifts. Even the infamous Christmas bombing campaign in North Vietnam by the US Air Force – the biggest such raid since the Second World War – was suspended on 25 December by President Nixon in 1972.
Perhaps Vladimir Putin, who we may safely assume approved the Christmas Day drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians, was making a point about Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision earlier this year to move the Ukrainian Christmas to December from the Orthodox tradition of 7 January.
At any rate, it was designed to demonstrate that Ukraine is dealing with a most ruthless foe, should proof be needed, in a perverse attempt to show how tough he can be. One person died and 15 were injured so that Putin could make his entirely unnecessary point. Safe to say, it will make Ukrainians even more determined to never give in.
Putin may consider himself tough, but his war has not been successful; nor has he been fortunate with his allies in recent weeks. Were it not for the imminent arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, Putin would certainly not have much to look forward to in 2025.
Under a chimerical Harris administration, US military and economic support would have been stepped up – and Europe, despite the political ructions in Paris and Berlin, would have remained loyal to Kyiv.
Despite the help of North Korean reinforcements and some Chinese equipment, the Russian forces have made only glacial progress on multiple fronts and their attacks would have been further blunted by the use of long-range Western-supplied missiles – and Ukrainian resistance stiffened by more advanced Nato weaponry and training.
The sanctions regime, however, compromised by devious friends of the Kremlin, has hit the Russian economy hard – and consumers are being squeezed further by the switching of the nation’s resources to the war machine. Questions about the conduct of the war are even routinely raised on Russia’s rabidly nationalistic official media channels.
As the war approaches its third anniversary in February, the chances of Putin leading a victory parade in Maidan Nezalezhnosti seem even more remote than when he launched his “special military operation” in 2022.
With the fall of President Assad of Syria – and Iran tamed by Israel – Putin is looking isolated and weak. He is increasingly dependent on Kim Jong Un, of all people, and President Xi to prop up his regime. Putin in effect leads a Potemkin regime and failure breeds instability.
As has happened before in Russia, a change of regime can come when it is hardly expected at the time, but then seems very obvious and inevitable in retrospect.
So the cliche “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” springs readily to mind as president-elect Donald Trump comes to Putin’s rescue – especially as the 47th president gets ready to implement his “peace in 24 hours” plan for Ukraine.
The opportunity to cage Putin will have passed. The year 2025 will almost certainly be one when the war in Ukraine ends. There will be some sort of deal. It will be more advantageous to Russia than it should be but, equally, it will not be the unmitigated disaster for Ukraine that seemed likely even a few months ago.
For some reason, the old bonhomie between Mr Trump and Putin seems to have evaporated, and the Russians have reverted to a Cold War mentality in which America is the permanent and implacable enemy, whoever happens to be in power in Washington.
Mr Trump, proud of his authorship of The Art of the Deal, will not simply give Ukraine to Putin – he will be demanding concessions and protecting America’s interests.
He will not want to look like he’s come off worst in the negotiations. It may even have dawned on Mr Trump that having Ukraine’s resources available to the world economy, rather than the kleptocrats in the Kremlin, would be the better outcome.
So while it is clear that Ukraine won’t be able to recover Crimea or some of its eastern lands, Putin won’t be able to absorb most of Ukraine into Russia.
By Christmas 2025, therefore, the bombings could well be over and the West – in reality, the EU, the UK and other committed Western powers – will need to help Ukraine rebuild and guarantee its security, whether it is inside Nato or (more likely) not.
That, at least, is something to look forward to after three years of pitiless warfare and the West’s failure to stand up to Russia’s unprovoked aggression.