The death of Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar on Thursday is an incredible achievement for Israel. It is also a blow to Iran and its axis of terror across the Middle East.
Since July, Israel has decapitated the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah – with the killings of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, and now Sinwar himself. There has also been the killing of two commanders of the IRGC Quds Force’s Lebanon Corps – Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Abbas Nilforoushan – in this year alone. While the Islamic Republic has suffered from eliminations of its regional henchmen for years, the breadth and depth of Israel’s recent operations is unprecedented.
Never before have Hamas and Hezbollah been simultaneously defanged in this way from the top of the organisation down
Hamas has lost previous leaders to Israel in the past, such as Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in 2004. Before Nasrallah’s death, Israel had also eliminated Hezbollah secretary-general Abbas al-Musawi in 1992. Yet Hamas and Hezbollah endured because of the institutional architecture that both organisations maintained, and because they had a pool of successors on standby. Never before have Hamas and Hezbollah been simultaneously defanged in this way from the top of the organisation down.
Hamas differs from Hezbollah in its relationship with Iran. Whereas Iran created Hezbollah and is the crown jewel of its terror proxies, Hamas has always maintained multiple foreign patrons – not just Tehran but also Qatar and Turkey. Whereas during the Nasrallah era, Iran had representatives on Hezbollah’s Shura Council and Jihad Council, that structure was not replicated with Hamas, which has always been more independent of Tehran than Hezbollah.
Nevertheless, Iran will seek to ensure its interests are protected as Sinwar’s successor is chosen. Candidates include Khaled Meshaal, who resides in luxury in Qatar, and was Haniyeh’s and Sinwar’s predecessor as political leader. However, Meshaal has had a complicated relationship with Tehran after they had a falling out over the latter’s support for Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war.
Iran therefore has other options. Those include Khalil al-Hayya, who is the deputy chairman of the Hamas political bureau and has been historically close with Iran. Internal Hamas documents that Israel seized in Gaza show al-Hayya liaising with the head of the IRGC’s Quds Force’s Palestinian Branch in Lebanon in the months leading up to the October 7 massacre in Israel, and briefing him on potential attack plans.
Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s brother who functioned as an important deputy, is also a prospect for future leadership in Gaza. However, whereas Yahya Sinwar previously travelled to Iran and met personally with the supreme leader in 2012, it remains unclear the extent of Mohammed’s personal relations with Iranian leaders. But other Hamas officials like al-Hayya could continue to provide backup to maintain the group’s Iranian connections.
Iran’s losses over the last few months may trigger a re-evaluation in Tehran over how to reestablish its own badly eroded deterrence against Israel. With two of its terror militias now degraded, there have been growing calls for the Islamic Republic to change its nuclear doctrine, namely to develop nuclear weapons. These calls have not only come from hardline voices in the IRGC but also from those in the Iranian political elite who have historically associated with more pragmatic political positions.
Tehran will likely weigh the costs versus the benefits of such a decision. To date, it has calculated that the costs outweigh the benefits of crossing the nuclear Rubicon. But with its regional power weakened, and its belief that the US does not want to confront Tehran militarily, that calculus could change. Public statements from Joe Biden ruling out Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iran have not helped matters and only reinforce this impression of weakness from Washington. The United States can still deter Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, but that will require it to adopt a more aggressive posture. It needs to threaten the stability of the Islamic Republic should it make the choice to develop a nuclear bomb.
In the end, Iran’s regional grand strategy is unlikely to fundamentally change absent regime change in Iran. Despite its proxies and partners bleeding, Iran will likely seek to find ways to rehabilitate its ‘ring of fire’ surrounding Israel. Eradicating Israel will continue to be a central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Tehran is very experienced at managing and manipulating preexisting terror entities, as well as rehabilitating them after losses as it did after the 2006 Lebanon War. Already, regional reports indicate the IRGC has dispatched the deputy commander of its Quds Force, Mohammadreza Fallahzadeh, as a ‘supervisor’ for Lebanese Hezbollah following Nasrallah’s demise. While Iran has been weakened again by the killing of Sinwar, it remains a lethal threat to Israel and the US.
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