ON THE AFTERNOON of August 5th, television in Bangladesh broadcast images of a helicopter rising from the residence of Sheikh Hasina, the country’s prime minister until minutes before. The chopper was carrying her and her sister “to safety”. Shortly afterwards images appeared of gleeful protesters entering the prime minister’s residence, lounging in her bed and making off with pets and furniture. Others were filmed dancing in the streets of Dhaka. In an address to the nation, General Waker-uz-Zaman, the army chief, confirmed that Sheikh Hasina had resigned and said he would form an interim government. One of the world’s wiliest autocrats, and its longest-serving female head of government, she had been summarily dispatched by angry citizens. “She is a blood-sucker, a monster for us, for the young people,” said a protester. “She destroyed Bangladesh.”
Sheikh Hasina ruled this country of 171m people for 20 of the past 28 years, mostly with an iron fist. Her political longevity relied on tacit backing from the army and on increasing oppression. An election in January returning her to power for the fifth time confirmed the country’s descent into a one-party state, with widespread rigging by her Awami League (AL) party and a boycott by the main opposition party. She combined strong-woman politics with impressive economic results: in the decade before covid-19 the country’s economy grew at 7% annually, buoyed by its garment industry and despite rampant cronyism. Bangladesh’s iron lady bolstered her rule by securing the backing of India, its powerful neighbour, while maintaining cordial relations with China, its main arms supplier. The West showed little interest in penalising her even as she abandoned democratic norms.
Until last month it looked as if Sheikh Hasina’s formula for maintaining power still worked. Then the protests began, led by students. The initial trigger was a reinstatement of a quota system that allotted at least 30% of government jobs to the descendants of freedom fighters in Bangladesh’s war of liberation from Pakistan in 1971, which protesters argued chiefly benefitted adherents of the AL. A crackdown by the police and army cost the lives of at least 200 people (unofficial estimates are higher), put over 10,000 in jail and shuttered schools and universities. Angered by the harsh response, students and others returned to the streets in greater numbers on August 3rd and 4th, demanding the prime minister’s resignation. More were killed in clashes with pro-government goons and the police. The government imposed a curfew and cut off broadband and mobile-data services.
On the morning of August 5th, tens of thousands of protesters marched to the prime minister’s residence in Dhaka. Initially the police and army met them with tear-gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. But faced with the prospect of inflicting large-scale bloodshed in order to defend a decaying regime, the security forces, and possibly senior figures in the AL, appear to have lost their nerve, allowing the protesters to pass. Soon Sheikh Hasina concluded that her position was untenable and fled by helicopter to India (and perhaps, after that, to London). A period of military rule now beckons. Addressing the nation after Sheikh Hasina’s exit, General Waker promised to form an interim government in consultation with the opposition and civil society.
Three huge questions now loom. One is whether there will be intensifying chaos on the streets and in the economy. Alongside jubilation in Dhaka lurks the threat of retaliatory violence in a highly polarised society. Relations between supporters of Sheikh Hasina, student protesters and other opposition groups are fractious: by the evening of August 5th AL offices in Dhaka and elsewhere had been set on fire. The economy’s strong headline growth has masked a jobs crisis among the young, two-fifths of whom lack reliable employment, and a balance of payments problem partly as a result of capital transfers out of Bangladesh by the country’s crony class. Its foreign reserves have fallen by more than half to $19bn since 2021. Even a caretaker military regime could face a deepening crisis, not a moment of national catharsis.
The second question is whether, after a period of caretaker military rule, a credible democratic system can be rebuilt. The appetite among the young protesters is certainly there. “I joined the protests 14 days ago. Today is the 15th day,” says one. “Now I have seen the victory. This Bangladesh is now made by Gen Z. I don’t want any martial law…I want a constitution which ensures human values”. Yet the former prime minister’s years-long campaign to snuff out all opposition opens a gaping political void. Independent institutions from the courts to election administrators have been undermined.
The main opposition party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), has many of its leaders in prison. If they are released it may rebuild its position, but the party suffers from many of the problems the AL does, including dynastic power politics, cronyism and its own record of oppression when in power. Bangladesh needs new parties, yet the last notable effort to create a new movement, in 2007 by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel-prize winning entrepreneur and philanthropist, failed to break the political oligarchy.
The final question is the extent to which outside powers seek to influence Bangladesh’s direction. Under Sheikh Hasina it aspired to be the archetypal swing state, balancing China, India and the West in order to extract the maximum concessions from abroad and guarantee the minimal level of interference. Having backed a decaying autocratic regime, India may now be more minded to push for a deeper political reset. And although America and Europe often turned a blind eye to Sheikh Hasina’s abuses, they have some leverage over the country as major markets for its garment exporters, and as potential sources of financial assistance. Ultimately, however, Bangladesh’s destiny after Sheikh Hasina lies in the hands of its citizens. General Waker has asked them to be “patient” as he manages the transition to a new government. He should not test their patience for too long. ■