Last week, in a surprising chance contact, Israeli forces eliminated the leader of Hamas and the mastermind of the October 7 massacre, Yayha Sinwar. Like the death of Osama bin Laden 10 years after 9-11, Sinwar’s death gives strategic closure to many people in Israel; Sinwar was the mastermind and commander of the deadliest massacre against Jews since the Holocaust, and the atrocities of October 7 caused deep psychological trauma for Jews, along with a loss of personal security that will be felt for a long time. The closure Sinwar’s death provides Israeli’s population is important for their moving forward and healing as a nation.
But there’s also poetic justice in the facts surrounding who killed Sinwar, when, and where. Sinwar was not killed by Israeli Special Forces acting on information collected by their elite intelligence organizations. He was killed by regular Israeli soldiers with tanks from the IDF’s Gaza division. It was the same division that collapsed on October 7. Videos and photos of their tanks and crews pillaged, burned, and desecrated were spread by so called journalists who travelled with Hamas on their massacre. The soldiers that killed Sinwar were also from the same unit that accidentally killed three Israeli hostages in Norther Gaza nine months ago.
Sinwar was also killed on the first day of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, a seven-day festival period during which Jews recall the days when the Israelites lived in huts (sukkot) during their years after the Exodus from Egypt. Sinwar initiated the October 7 massacre on the last day of Sukkot last year.
Then there’s the fact that Sinwar was killed in the city of Rafah in Southern Gaza. Israel’s government had to overrule the strong objections and threats of the international community to move into Rafah, yet that is where six Israeli hostages were found after they were brutally murdered last month. Over 100 cross-border tunnels being used to arm and supply Hamas were also found there.
AP
But the details of Sinwar’s death also tell us a lot about the state of Hamas. Much like when U.S. forces discovered Saddam Hussein cowering in a hole, the myth about Sinwar has been busted. He was not found looking defiant and capable, surrounded by an elite bodyguard force in one of the luxury bunkers discovered in areas of Gaza like Khan Yunis. Sinwar was killed looking desperate, dirty, and disheveled, living in fear, running from tunnel to tunnel, rubbled house to rubbled house, with only a couple other men, in a district he had hidden in because the world told the IDF they could not go there.
He was not commanding a military force with any capability. He oversaw nothing.
He had the pocket litter of a bum: a pack of mentos, tissues, some money, and a fake passport with the occupation listed as employee of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Hamas is clearly broken. It clearly is operating without leadership, on autopilot and functioning as separate, disconnected guerrilla gangs completely unable to do organized acts.
Yes, Hamas could nominally elect and announce new leaders to replace Ismail Haniyeh, the Qatar based Hamas political leader killed last month, with another terrorist, someone like Khalil al-Hayya, who currently leads the hostage negotiations outside of Gaza. They could ceremonially announce a leader to run shadow operations inside Gaza, perhaps Yayha’s brother, Mohammed Sinwar. Fanatical member of Hamas may still believe they can survive and one day win the war against Israel.
But peace for Israel and Gaza only ultimately comes if Hamas if prevented from regaining political or military power in the Gaza Strip.
Still, this could be the beginning of the end, though there is still a lot that must happen. If Hamas refuses to let the remaining 101 hostages go, the war will continue. If Hamas still has the guns and coercive power to include primary control of humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza, the war will continue. If Hamas believes they can survive as a political or military power in Gaza the war will continue.
The IDF will continue operations to rescue hostages and find, clear, remove Hamas military capabilities and political power in Gaza. The challenge of getting humanitarian aid to Gazans when gangs of Hamas try to prevent and steal it will continue. Pockets without Hamas gangs must eventually be created so that new Gazan powers can be formed to govern, secure, and distribute humanitarian aid, and to facilitate rebuilding.
Wars are won when the enemy loses the means and will to continue fighting violently toward what are in essence political goals. There will be no cease in the cycle of violence without the full military and political defeat of Hamas. But the death of Yayha Sinwar is a major moment that signals to Hamas, Israelis, and Gazans that there could be paths to end the war.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project and host of the “Urban Warfare Project Podcast.” He served for 25 years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book” Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connection in Modern War” and co-author of” Understanding Urban Warfare.“
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own. They are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, Army University, or the U.S. Military Academy.